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Multilateral Environmental Agreements up to 2050: 
Are They Sustainable Enough? 
Abstract 
 
Today, reducing CO2 emissions is a global target which nearly all countries in the world 
prioritize. Some countries have ratified up to 30 multilateral environmental agreements 
regarding the atmosphere up to 2006. This number has been surging since 1989 after the 
ratification of the Montreal Protocol. Following the findings of the inverted U-shaped 
Environmental Kuznets Curve and applying a spline model, I can show the beneficial 
impact of the rising number of multilateral environmental agreements on the forecasts 
of CO2 emissions up to 2050. My results indicate that the number of atmosphere-related 
multilateral environmental agreements generates good will among global cooperation 
efforts towards reducing CO2 emissions and therefore provides a good basis for 
effective programs to stop climate change.  
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A post-Kyoto Protocol seems to be a preferential solution to climate change
which would address the global disagreements and concerns regarding global
warming. But, as seen in Copenhagen at the end of 2009, the world’s gov-
ernment leaders were not able to restart global cooperation aimed at stopping
climate change. In spite of this, there was a sense of hope that a post-Kyoto
Protocol would be signed at the next meeting in Cancœn (Mexico) 2010. This
hope has been buoyed by the fact that the current US government displays more
moral sense and a much higher awareness of climate change than a decade ago.
According to Barack Obama’s statement which has been quoted in the press
all over the world, "we have come a long way, but we have much further to
go".1 Even though the USA is the only one of the industrialized countries in
the world still to ratify the Kyoto Protocol (cf. Mitchell, 2007), the fact men-
tioned above encourages people all over the world to hope for an early global
agreement to climate change, i.e., a working post-Kyoto Protocol. A sense of
bitter disappointment has been apparent in the press after the 15th UN Climate
Change Conference in Copenhagen, as it became clear that no new agreement
would be signed. Due to this, one needs to pose the question whether such a
post-Kyoto Protocol is able to address the huge challenges of global warming
and whether the worldwide belief invested in this course of action is appropri-
ate and advisable. My data show that multilateral environmental agreements
(MEAs) regarding our atmosphere - like the Kyoto Protocol - are measurably
bene￿cial for the purpose of stopping climate change. Moreover, I can show
that the rapidly rising number of atmosphere related MEAs, with its underly-
ing CO2 emission reduction e￿orts, will play an important role in the countries’
CO2 emission behavior up to 2050.
The following section describes and evaluates the data to be applied within
an introductive and descriptive analysis. Section 3 outlines the spline model
and the corresponding results I use for the projections of the year-￿xed e￿ects
and the number of atmosphere MEAs in section 4. Section 5 wraps up the
projection results of CO2 emissions up to 2050 with and without the impacts of
multilateral environmental agreements; and section 6 concludes.
2 Data description and descriptive statistics
Five di￿erent sources provide the data base for the four variables I make use of
in this paper: Real gross domestic product (GDP) in constant 2000 US$ from
Maddison’s (2003) historical time-series is extrapolated for missing years by
using growth indices at real U.S. dollars from the World Bank’s World Develop-
ment Indicators 2008. Population data is also drawn up from these two sources.
CO2 emissions (in kt CO2) were conveniently downloadable from World Bank’s
World Development Indicators 2008. The underlying number of multilateral
environmental agreements is made up of the Center for International Earth Sci-
ence Information Network (CIESIN), Data-base from Socioeconomic Data and
Applications Center (SEDAC) (see CIESIN, 2006) and of a dataset by courtesy
1among others see msnbc.com news services, updated 12/19/2009 7:42:09 AM ET, http:
//www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34475636/
1of Ron Mitchell (see Mitchell, 2007). To ￿lter out the atmosphere related MEAs
I make use of the UNEP cluster￿cation of MEAs (cf. UNEP, 2001). All four
variables range from 1960 to 2006 and capture 160 countries (see table 1).
Table 1: Dataset
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Year 7520 1983 13.6 1960 2006
GDP (bn) 7520 143.3 637.2 0.036 11,410
Population (m) 7520 30.6 107.2 0.016 1,311
CO2 emissions (kt) 7520 112,985 455,239 -80 6,977,011
GDP per capita 7520 5,243 8,441 62 72,674
CO2 per capita 7520 3.7 5.9 -0.019 94.1
Number of 7520 3 5 0 30
atmosphere MEAs
I apply per capita values of GDP and CO 2 emissions for the econometric
model. Figures 1 and 2 display the relationship of these variables, visualizing
the ￿ndings of the inverted U-shaped Environmental Kuznets Curve ￿ i.e., at
￿rst ascending and then decreasing CO 2 emissions with increasing GDP per
capita ￿ using the example of six representative countries. In ￿gure 1 India
represents a developing country with low GDP per capita and thus rising per
capita CO2 emissions with increasing GDP per capita. South Korea, a former
developing country, displays a still rising but upward sloping graph, typical for
countries that have been recently considered as developed. Israel also shows
an upward sloping graph, but at a certain GDP per capita value (near 19,500
dollars) CO2 emissions start to fall. Similarly for Germany, with a peak at
around 15,000 dollars. Great Britain’s peak is at even less than 15,000 dollars,
but the graph is very volatile. The United States’ per capita CO 2 emissions
decrease after around 19,500 dollars GDP per capita, like Israel. In ￿gure 2 all
countries are plotted in one graph to underline the stimulus threshold of around
19,500 dollars per capita and the clear Environmental Kuznets Curve relation
between per capita values of CO 2 emissions and GDP. Later in section 3 these
relationships will be re￿ected in the regression results, and with that justify
applying GDP per capita to explain the countries’ CO 2 emissions by means of
the respective equations in that section. For example, countries with the highest
GDP per capita values (between 17,084 and 72,674 dollars) are the only ones
that exhibit lowering impacts on per capita CO 2 emissions.
For the projection approaches in section 4 I apply world average annual
growth rates for GDP and population from the IPCC emission scenarios IS92
dataset version 1.1 (see Pepper, Xing, Chen, and Moss, 1992). These numbers
2Figure 1: Representative countries in di￿erent stadiums of the
Environmental Kuznets Curve
Figure 2: Level speci￿c relationship of per capita CO 2 emissions
and per capita GDP
are to be found in table 3 of section 4. Unfortunately I cannot apply more
recent data from the IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES), be-
cause there GDP values are denoted at market exchange rates (mex) instead of
3constant US$. 2 But in ￿gure 17 of the IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR),
Climate Change 2001, Working Group I, The Scienti￿c Basis, the very similar
trend of CO2 emissions of the A1B scenario based on data from the IPCC Spe-
cial Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES) and the ones of IS92 are clearly to
be seen (see ￿gure A1). Moreover, by the use of IS92 data the main purpose
of this paper is not constrained by any lack of current ￿gures, because I do not
want to reveal another up-to-date CO 2 emissions forecast in the fashion of many
other researchers before me. What I want to do, is to consider CO 2 emissions
forecasts in relation to forecasts that account for the impacts of multilateral
environmental agreements on CO 2 emissions. With the IPCC IS92 data I can
￿lter out very vividly the bene￿cial impact of the number of atmosphere MEAs
by comparing my results with those of Schmalensee, Stoker, and Judson (1998)
which are also based on growth rates from IPCC IS92.
Though I described the outcome of the 15th UN Climate Change Confer-
ence in Copenhagen as disappointing in my introduction, the participants were
however able to reach a compromise ￿ The Copenhagen Accord (see UNFCCC,
2009) ￿ which represents the intention to keep rises in global temperature to less
than +2C. This rise in temperature until 2050 can be complied with the IPCC
A1B scenario (see IPCC SRES, 2000; IPCC TAR, 2001; Pepper, Xing, Chen,
and Moss, 1992) which represents a balanced energy mix across all sources, a
mid-range increase in CO2 emissions until 2050, and decreasing CO 2 emissions
after 2050. In my opinion, this is a very realistic and plausible scenario for the
future - at least for the years up to 2050. My projection results in section 5 con-
front the +2C goal of The Copenhagen Accord with global achievements due to
multilateral environmental agreements classi￿ed with atmosphere. But before
I start with the statistical impacts of atmosphere MEAs on CO 2 emissions, I
want to introduce the most important Pros and Cons of MEAs, summarized in
a SWOT analysis in ￿gure 3.
A big advantage of MEAs is their multilateral and voluntary character. To
preserve the sovereignty of all countries inside a MEA voluntariness is indispens-
able. As environmental concerns do not stop at a country’s border, joint actions
of a multilateral form are a good way to handle environmental protection. By
means of the discussion and negotiation process in the run-up to a MEA, this
form of global cooperation seems to be a very e￿cient instrument to allocate the
participants’ rights and obligations, as well as to attract worldwide attention to
global environmental a￿airs with the associated preventive and precautionary
resource management. On the one hand these strengths o￿er opportunities, but
on the other hand they contain threats which can result in weaknesses. For
example, the negotiation process during the pre-agreement period may indeed
bring about global consensus. But to what extent this consensus means to deal
with the consequences if a country deviates from the agreement, or provide
guidance to resource management speci￿c behavioral changes is often vague.
Another ine￿ectiveness of MEAs may result from their voluntary character and
thus from free-rider advantages of not signing or ratifying a MEA (e.g., the Ky-
oto Protocol, which is not rati￿ed by the USA). Numerous authors have analyzed
these strategic aspects by use of game theoretic approaches (among many others
see Barrett and Stavins, 2003; Barrett, 2001; Barrett, 1994; Bloch and Gomes,
2006; Buchholz, Haupt, and Peters, 2005; Caparr￿s, Hammoudi, and Tazda￿t,
2cf. IPCC Data Distribution Centre at http://www.ipcc-data.org/
4Figure 3: SWOT analysis of multilateral environmental agreements
2004; Carraro, 1998; Carraro, Eyckmans, and Finus, 2006; Carraro, Marchiori,
and Sgobbi, 2005; Chander and Tulkens, 1992; Finus and Rundshagen, 1998;
Finus, van Ierland, and Dellink, 2006; Hoel, 1992; Hoel and Schneider, 1997).
In my opinion, a material weakness of MEAs is that due to their voluntariness
sharp cuts in resource usage or high abatement costs cannot be written down
in such agreements. Costly or unsatisfactory environmental goals generate high
incentives not to sign or to deviate from a MEA. This especially is the case
for a potential post-Kyoto Protocol. This means that only small steps can be
taken with single MEAs. Up to the present time the e￿ect of a single MEA
is di￿cult to measure as there is no adequate performance index that captures
the di￿erent mechanisms of MEAs. But in the medium or long run the sum of
a range of MEAs may become equal to an important big step in environmental
protection. Coordination among di￿erent MEAs is often a further problem. On
the one hand, coordination is important and it would be bene￿cial to subsume
di￿erent environmental issues in one MEA. On the other hand, it implies huge
coordination e￿orts with an enormous demand for expertise in all the di￿erent
environmental issue-areas which the agreement shall cover. In conjunction with
inadequate funding this is often not achievable. But the lack of synergy among
di￿erent MEAs does not stand in contrast to the opportunities of worldwide
sustainable use of natural resources that can be achieved with further e￿orts in
single environmental disciplines. MEAs also further the development and stan-
dardization of best practices and best strategies in environmental protection
issues. Last but not least, the voluntary and multilateral character of MEAs
encourages green consciousness for present and future generations all over the
world. This is of course also true for MEAs in general, as well as for MEAs
classi￿ed with atmosphere, which I will be focused on in this study.
5Figure 4: The number of atmosphere MEAs in 2006
The map in ￿gure 4 shows the worldwide distribution of the number of
atmosphere MEAs rati￿ed until 2006. The number of atmosphere MEAs is
separated into ￿ve quantiles: 0-20, 20-40, 40-60, 60-80, and 80-100 quantiles.
Hereby countries can be easily classed as countries with the median number
of atmosphere MEAs (yellow), countries with a low or the lowest number of
atmosphere MEAs (red and dark red), and countries with a high or the highest
number of atmosphere MEAs (green and dark green). For example, Germany
and Luxembourg are dark green colored as they show the highest number of
MEAs related to atmosphere in 2006. The United States, Latvia, Cyprus, and
Azerbaijan are also dark green colored as they produce just enough MEAs to
be in the top group. Interestingly, the typical black sheep in terms of emitting
CO2 ￿ the United States, Russia, and China ￿ are colored green or dark green.
This fact indicates why hope in more positive developments in the reduction
of CO2 emissions in the future might not be misplaced. The high number of
atmosphere MEAs state that these countries do not block global cooperations
to reduce CO2 emissions to the extent which the negotiation di￿culties of the
Kyoto Protocol would suggest, e.g., as shown by the fact that the USA did not
yet ratify that Protocol (cf. Mitchell, 2007).
3 Econometric model
According to the Environmental Kuznets Curve the level of GDP per capita
matters in terms of a country’s CO 2 emission behavior. And according to the
graphs in ￿gure 1 and 2 countries show similar behavior inside a speci￿c GDP
per capita range. Hence countries should be sampled into di￿erent segments to
6￿lter out their segment speci￿c impact on per capita CO 2 emissions. Similar
to Schmalensee, Stoker, and Judson (1998) I apply a spline model with 10
segments. They show that the explanatory power of 10 or 12 segments is not
signi￿cantly di￿erent from using 20 or 24 segments but much more convenient
to use. This segmentation is labeled by function F in the following regression
equation:
ln(cit) = i + t + sF [ln(yit] + it; (1)
where cit denotes per capita CO2 emissions country i, i = 1;:::;N has emit-
ted in year t, t = 1;:::;T. i and t represent the country-￿xed and year-￿xed
e￿ects respectively. yit are country speci￿c and yearly values of GDP per capita,
and s speci￿es the segment speci￿c parameter that is to be estimated. The
error term is denoted by it. In order to be able to compare results of this model
with results of a model which additionally captures the impact of MEAs related
to atmosphere, I add xit 1, representing the country speci￿c and yearly count
of atmosphere MEAs lagged by one period, and the associated segment speci￿c
parameter s to equation (1). This lag ensures that potential endogeneity or
collinearity ￿ through a contemporaneous impulse from cit on xit or yit on xit
(see Egger, Jessberger and Larch, 2011a and 2011b) ￿ can be excluded. I also
experimented with more than one lag, but results did not change signi￿cantly: 3
ln(cit) = i + t + sF [ln(yit)] + sF [xit 1] + it (2)
Results of equation (1) and (2) are to be found in table 2. Due to the log-
log speci￿cation of per capita CO 2 emissions and per capita GDP estimations,
results of F [ln(yit)] can be directly interpreted as elasticities. The inverted U-
shape of the Environmental Kuznets Curve can be quite clearly seen. Here it
appears ￿rst as a backslash followed by the classical inverted U-shape: In the
￿rst four segments the e￿ect of GDP per capita is falling from a high value. Then
it rises again up to the middle segments and ￿ skipping the insigni￿cant impact of
the 7th segment ￿ from segment 8 onwards the e￿ect is decreasing again. In the
10th segment it is well below zero and signi￿cant. This is true for both equations.
According to GDP per capita values, India is listed in segments 1 to 4 and Korea
in segments 5 to 9 over the whole period between 1960 and 2006. Thus, they can
serve as examples of the two decreasing trends described above. As countries
like the United States, Germany, France, and Great Britain are part of the 10 th
segment, the negative and signi￿cant e￿ect of this segment becomes plausible
when observing the decreasing CO 2 per capita values with increasing GDP per
capita of these countries in ￿gure 1 and ￿gure 2. MEAs related to atmosphere
display a signi￿cant impact on the CO 2 emissions per capita in all segments, and
as a sign of e￿ectiveness their direction is always negative. Another insight which
can be derived from table 2 is that with the rising segment number the impact of
the number of atmosphere MEAs decreases. Unfortunately this does not explain
where the declining impact of multilateral environmental agreements at rising
GDP per capita stems from. It may however represent the relatively higher e￿ect
in reducing CO2 emissions by countries with relatively lower GDP per capita
3Furthermore, estimation results can avert suspicion in endogeneity as coe￿cients for
F [ln(yit)] do not change much (see table 2) if controlling additionally for the number MEAs
classi￿ed with atmosphere. This means that with equation (2) I am able to ￿lter the e￿ect of
the number of atmosphere MEAs out of the country-￿xed e￿ect.
7values, as these countries have a relatively higher marginal product in CO 2
emission reduction (or lower marginal abatement costs) than richer countries
that already invest much in CO 2 emission reduction. This fact is supported by
the objectives of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) where the reduction
of CO2 emissions in developed countries can also be ful￿lled by developing
countries. Hereby abatement cost saving opportunities can be achieved and the
corresponding reduction e￿ort can be used in part to meet the Kyoto Protocol
reduction targets of the developed countries. 4
Table 2: Estimation results of GDP per capita and the number of atmosphere
MEAs
Equation (1) Equation (2)
Seg- GDP range GDP GDP Number of atmo-
ments (2000 US$) per capita per capita sphere MEAs
(1) 62 - 215 2.3307 2.4257 -0.6461
(2) 215 - 343 0.7762 0.7669 0.0139
(3) 343 - 574 -0.0516 -0.0513 -0.2806 
(4) 574 - 928 -0.0420 -0.0496  -0.1457
(5) 928 - 1,452 1.1769 1.0406 -0.1610
(6) 1,452 - 2,250 1.2892 1.0559 -0.1439
(7) 2,250 - 4,231 -0.6268 -0.5618 -0.0887 
(8) 4,231 - 8,751 0.5938 0.5313 -0.0438
(9) 8,751 - 17,084 0.1846 0.2995 -0.0323
(10) 17,084 - 72,674 -0.5199  -0.4142 -0.0143
Notes: , ,  indicates that parameters are signi￿cant at 5%, 1%,
and 0.1%, respectively. There are 160 countries and 7,520 observations,
or more speci￿cally, 752 observations per segment. Parameters are esti-
mated over the period 1960-2006.
4 Projection approach
Forecast models are invented primarily to forecast values one-step ahead, how-
ever as they lose forecasting power very rapidly when trying to forecast 12 steps
ahead or more, I use IPCC projections for population and GDP for the years
between 2006 and 2050 from IPCC IS92 (see Pepper, Xing, Chen, and Moss,
1992), analogous to Schmalensee, Stoker, and Judson (1998), summarized in
table 3. Schmalensee, Stoker, and Judson (1998) stated in their paper that a
￿serious question is whether [...] per-capita income is likely to be the same in
4cf. The Marrakesh Accords, 2001.
8the future as in the recent past, since future decisions in all nations will be made
with di￿erent technologies and environmental information than past decisions￿
(p. 20, footnote 21). Because they employed measured data up to 1990, and
because from 1990 up to 2006 countries’ activities related to multilateral envi-
ronmental agreements increased enormously, the availability of data of the last
two decades provides new ￿ndings and solves their claim to some extent. With
my approach of ￿ltering out the impact of the number of atmosphere MEAs I
am able to give additional insights into future CO 2 emission reduction e￿orts
in the world by means of environmental agreements.
Table 3: IPCC A1B scenario projections of GDP and population




To complete the projection approach or rather to extrapolate the remaining
two parameters ￿ the year-￿xed e￿ects and the number of atmosphere MEAs
￿ I make use of a linear and a nonlinear method like Schmalensee, Stoker, and
Judson (1998). With these two methods I try to capture a plausible corridor of
the parameters.
The linear approach is a linear spline model with two growth rates for the
periods before and after 1980 (superscript l indicating linear). t contains the
years, 1[t  1980] represents a dummy which is zero for the years before 1980,
and , , and  are to be estimated:
l





i(t   1980)  1[t  1980] (4)
From a statistical point of view, 1980 symbolizes the start of a growing
impact of the number of atmosphere MEAs on the regression results. In ￿gure
5 both graphs of the year-￿xed e￿ects run parallel before 1980. But afterwards
the regression that accounts for the number of atmosphere MEAs has a higher
gradient. Thus, I try to capture this point of separation with a di￿erent trend
for the years after 1980.
The nonlinear method (with superscript nl) aims at covering the upward
sloping trend of the year-￿xed e￿ects over the whole course of time. Here a log-
arithmic function comes very close to the real trend. Unlike the linear approach
all years of the dataset are taken into account:
nl




i t + nl
i ln(t   1950) (6)
For the linear and nonlinear projection approach of the year-￿xed e￿ects
(equations (3) and (5)) I need to exclude the years after 2001. In ￿gure 5 the
9sharp decline in the year-￿xed e￿ects in 2001, representing the impacts of 10/11,
is clear to see. If I had used the years from 2002 to 2006 for the projection,
I would have projected only further declining year-￿xed e￿ects after 2006 and
for all following years. As this drop is still predominant in the last year of my
sample, it outweighs the actual upward sloping trend of the whole sample and
thus leads to incorrect and undersized projections. This is particularly severe for
the nonlinear projection approach. As a result of this, without loss of generality
I use only the years from 1960 to 2001 for the year-￿xed e￿ects projections.
Figure 5: Year-￿xed e￿ects between 1960 and 2006
Figure 6: Year-￿xed e￿ects projections until 2050
10Similar to the year-￿xed e￿ects I project the number of atmosphere MEAs
linearly as well as nonlinearly applying equations (4) and (6). Projection re-
sults open a corridor to a world average number of 25 to 29 atmosphere MEAs
in 2050 (see ￿gure 7), i.e., nearly as many atmosphere MEAs as Germany or
Luxembourg had in 2006. In my opinion, this is a plausible future scenario of
a realistic average number of atmosphere MEAs in the world. Between 1980
and 2006, e.g., Germany and Luxembourg raised their number of atmosphere
MEAs from 4 and 5 to 30. In other words, they increased sixfold their number
of atmosphere MEAs within 26 years. Thus it should be plausible to assume
the world average number of MEAs will rise from 9 (in 2006) to 25 or 29 (in
2050). This means that on average, the number of atmosphere MEAs in the
world only needs to be tripled until 2050. Thus, a ￿ctional world average coun-
try has nearly double as many years, than Germany and Luxembourg had, to
only triple its number of atmosphere MEAs.
Figure 7: World average number of atmosphere MEAs
between 1960 and 2050
5 Results
Employing the projections of GDP and Population, which are based on IPCC
A1B scenario growth rates, and the linearly and nonlinearly projected year-￿xed
e￿ects, as well as the number of atmosphere MEAs and the application of spline
models, I can now compute the corresponding CO 2 emissions until 2050.
In ￿gure 8 one can ￿nd one benchmark curve of the IPCC A1B scenario,
two curves representing the 10-segment spline model results with linear and
nonlinear projection approaches of the year-￿xed e￿ects, and four curves based
on di￿erent combinations of linear and nonlinear projections of the year-￿xed
e￿ects and the number of atmosphere MEAs. For an easier identi￿cation of
the curves I use short dashes for CO 2 emissions results based on linear projec-
11Figure 8: Carbon dioxide emission projections
tions of year-￿xed e￿ects and long dashes for results with nonlinear projected
year-￿xed e￿ects. One dot separating the dashes indicates additionally linear
projected atmosphere MEAs. Two dots separating the dashes symbolize results
of an underlying nonlinear projection approach of the number of atmosphere
MEAs. The two curves that do not consider the number of atmosphere MEAs
(short dashes and long dashes without dots) are very similar to the results of
Schmalensee, Stoker, and Judson (1998). Here CO 2 emissions double or nearly
triple compared to emissions in 2006, reaching an index value of 222 and 289,
respectively.5 But taking into account the growing number of multilateral envi-
ronmental agreements related to atmosphere, CO 2 emissions projection results
can be reduced signi￿cantly (see red curves vs. blue curves in ￿gure 8). By
introducing linearly projected atmosphere MEAs, corresponding CO 2 emissions
projections can be reduced by 86 index points, i.e., 29.8% in 2050 (short-dash
curve vs. short-dash-dot curve) or by 60 index points and 27.0% (long-dash
curve vs. long-dash-dot curve), respectively. With the latter setting, CO 2 emis-
sions projections can actually undercut the IPCC A1B scenario projections. And
assuming both nonlinear projected year-￿xed e￿ects and atmosphere MEAs, re-
sults can fall short even further. More precisely, here CO 2 emissions projections
5In fruitful discussions with Maximilian Au￿hammer during his stay at the Ifo Institute for
Economic Research at the Univerity of Munich, I learned about another model setting which
probably predicts the total level of CO 2 emissions more precisely. In a forthcoming paper
Aufhammer and Steinhauser (2010) show that their new model setting of a slightly changed
composition of a reduced form model can slightly outperform that of Schmalensee, Stoker, and
Judson (1998) on the basis of U.S. CO 2 emissions data at the state level. But in a performance
test between their best model and the ones of Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995), Yang and
Schneider (1998), and Schmalensee, Stoker, and Judson (1998) the ￿Schmalensee et al. (1998)
predictions lie closest to the best model among the three￿ (Au￿hammer and Steinhauser,
2010, p.17). In addition, as I compute the di￿erences of CO 2 emissions projections between
equations (1) and (2) this slight lack in accuracy does not harm my relative results.
12are 26 index points or 15.3% lower than the IPCC A1B scenario projections in
2050. In relation to the curve that does not account for atmosphere MEAs (but
also contains nonlinear projected year-￿xed e￿ects) this impact actually equals
78 index points or 35.1% fewer CO 2 emissions in 2050. This means that the mod-
erate accelerating number of MEAs classi￿ed with atmosphere (see atmosphere
MEAs projections in section 4) intensi￿es its impact on CO 2 emissions over
time, to the extent that emissions can be reduced by up to 35.1% or even 37.4%
in 2050 relative to projections which do not take into consideration atmosphere
related multilateral environmental agreements. These values represent compar-
isons that can be drawn from the two scenarios based on nonlinear projected
year-￿xed e￿ects and the two scenarios assuming linear projected year-￿xed ef-
fects, respectively. Interestingly all four settings that account for the impact
of a growing number of atmosphere MEAs are located around the IPCC A1B
scenario. Thus, they put forward a corridor of scenarios in which it would to
be possible to ful￿ll the +2C goal of the Copenhagen Accord with the aid of
small but continuous steps achieved with atmosphere related multilateral envi-
ronmental agreements.
One could argue that reducing CO 2 emissions to an appropriate level such
that the +2C goal is reachable, would raise the need of atmosphere Meas with
severe emission reduction targets, meaning notably more stringent CO 2 emis-
sion standards than atmosphere MEAs displayed in the years before the Kyoto
Protocol. This is exactly what I thought the data would show. But forecasting
the history of atmosphere MEAs, i.e. transferring their historic and low impact
on CO2 emissions reductions into the years up to 2050, they su￿ciently and
signi￿cantly reduce emissions below a certain threshold which is needed to ful￿l
the Copenhagen Accord. Looking at the hard and long procedures before an-
other atmosphere MEA is rati￿ed, as seen in the surrounding circumstances of
a planned post-Kyoto Protocol, it is obvious to have doubts about future MEAs
to be signed and rati￿ed in a similarly high number as during the last four
decades. But climate protection and especially reducing CO 2 emissions is not
an old topic area like ￿shing conventions. For example the ￿rst multilateral en-
vironmental agreement has been signed in 1877 "concerning ￿shing in the Rhine
and its in￿uxes as well as in Lake Constance" by Alsace-Lorraine, Baden and
Switzerland (see. Mitchell, 2007). As a result of this, ￿rst of all public resistance
had to be erupted in the 1970s (see the slight increase of atmosphere MEAs in
the 1970s in ￿gure 7) and public acceptance for environmental protection rules
has not been easier to establish than today. As the ￿rst strong resistances have
been given up until today, a quicker development of atmosphere related MEAs
should be appropriate to assume. But even assuming a moderate increase in
atmosphere MEAs up to 2050, which is animated by the moderate historic de-
velopments, important steps in CO 2 emission reductions can be achieved and
the +2C goal of the Copenhagen Accord seems to be reachable due to the
impacts of atmosphere related multilateral environmental agreements.
136 Conclusion
Multilateral environmental agreements in general, as well as multilateral envi-
ronmental agreements classi￿ed with atmosphere in particular, are a plausible
means by which to bring the world, or at least more than two countries, to
the negotiation table. Until now atmosphere MEAs represent the one and only
way to come to a global agreement about global warming. This e￿ort can be
attributed to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) or more speci￿cally to the Kyoto Protocol. Analyzing the quan-
titative e￿ects of atmosphere MEAs on the ￿ght against climate change, i.e.
reducing CO2 emissions, yields to a optimistic view. There is a signi￿cant and
negative e￿ect of atmosphere MEAs on per capita CO 2 emissions, and they
can cause a global sustainable development which keeps temperature rise below
+2C until 2050.
This leads to the conclusion that current and future atmosphere MEAs are
su￿cient in stopping climate change. My results o￿er a sustainable option for
global warming e￿orts. Green thinking of many countries’ politicians and a
growing eco-friendly consciousness may lead to the implementation of further
necessary measures (like CO 2 certi￿cate trading or carbon tax policies) in order
to limit CO2 emissions even more e￿ectively. However, atmosphere MEAs seem
to make a major contribution to reasonable CO 2 emissions reductions until 2050.
14Appendix
Figure A1: IPCC SRES scenarios
This is ￿gure 17 of the IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR), Climate
Change 2001, Working Group I, The Scienti￿c Basis (see IPCC TAR, 2001;
downloadable at http://www.grida.no/publications/other/ipcc_tar/ ). In
the upper left box the very similar trend of CO 2 emissions of the A1B scenario
based on data from the IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES)
(see IPCC SRES, 2000), and the emissions of the IS92 (see Pepper, W. J., X.
Xing, R. S. Chen, and R. H. Moss, 1992) are clear to see.
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